

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 011498

62

ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 DODE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00

OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02

SS-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 BIB-01 /082 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/IR:THIRSCHFELD

APPROVED BY C:HSONNENFELDT

EUR/RPM:GHELMAN

PM/DCA:CFLOWEREE

NSC:MHIGGINS

JCS:RMCCANN

OSD:COL MICHAEL

ACDA/IR:DKLEIN

S/S: JMEALUM

----- 060763

O 170004Z JAN 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE

USCINCEUR VAIHAGEN GER

USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS

S E C R E T STATE 011498

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT:MBFR: ALLIED TREATMENT OF EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL

1. IN FURTHER SPC DISCUSSION OF THE EASTERN FREEZE
PROPOSAL, YOU SHOULD SEEK ALLIED AGREEMENT TO REJECT THIS
PROPOSAL DEFINITIVELY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 011498

NEGOTIATING ROUND.

2. IN PUTTING FORWARD THIS POSITION, YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. A FREEZE COMMITMENT WOULD GIVE THE EAST ONE OF THE MAIN THINGS IT WANTS IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS -- LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE OF NATO FORCES WITH NO COMMENSURATE GAINS FOR THE WEST. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE THE EAST A PROPAGANDA VEHICLE FOR OBJECTING TO US AND NATO EFFORTS TO SUBSTITUTE COMBAT FOR SUPPORT FORCES AND COULD INTERFERE WITH US EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN ITS FORCE AT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH.

B. ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON A FORCE FREEZE IN 1975 WOULD MEET THE EVIDENT DESIRE OF SOVIET NEGOTIATORS TO SHOW PROGRESS IN 1975, A TIME-FRAME TO WHICH BREZHNEV IS

PUBLICLY COMMITTED. IF THE SOVIETS ARE ABLE TO MEET THEIR OWN CURRENT REQUIREMENTS FOR PROGRESS IN VIENNA IN 1975 THROUGH A FREEZE AGREEMENT WITH THE WEST, THEY WOULD NO LONGER BE UNDER PRESSURE TO REACH SPECIFIC REDUCTION RESULTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE A TIME LIMITED FREEZE WOULD LIKELY BE EXTENDED SO LONG AS NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE VIRTUALLY UNLIMITED TIME TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS, WHILE THE WEST WILL BE SUBJECT TO INCREASING PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURES.

C. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW LEAKS, PRESS AND PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL HAS THUS FAR BEEN MINIMAL, AND THE ALLIES ARE UNDER NO PRESSURE TO AGREE TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THE POSITION DESCRIBED BELOW WOULD ENABLE ALLIED OFFICIALS TO TL INTERESTED ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THEIR COUNTRIES THAT THE WEST DOES NOT IN PRINCIPLE OPPOSE A FREEZE IN CONJUNCTION WITH REDUCTIONS AND IN FACT HAS PROPOSED TO THE EAST A FREEZE ON ALL MANPOWER IN THE AREA TO COMPLEMENT PHASE I REDUCTIONS. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE VIENNA TALKS FOCUS ON THEIR REAL BUSINESS OF NEGOTIATING REDUCTIONS AND NOT GET SIDETRACKED ONTO OTHER QUESTIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT, IF THIS APPROACH IS ADEQUATELY PRESENTED, IT SHOULD EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH SEGMENTS OF WESTERN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 011498

POLITICAL OR PUBLIC OPINION WHICH MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN A FREEZE.

D. OUR MAIN CONCERN WITH THE IDEA OF A COUNTERPROPOSAL TO THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL AS SUGGESTED BY SOME ALLIES IS PRECISELY THAT IN MAKING SUCH A COUNTERPROPOSAL THE ALLIES WOULD BE COMMITTING THEMSELVES IN PRINCIPLE TO A FREEZE SEPARATE FROM AND PRIOR TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON

REDUCTIONS -- A POSITION WHICH, AS HAS BEEN SHOWN,
ACHIEVES A MAJOR SOVIET OBJECTIVE WITH NO COMMENSURATE
GAIN FOR THE WEST. ONCE HAVING MADE A COUNTERPROPOSAL,
THE WEST WOULD BE OBLIGED TO NEGOTIATE ON IT AND THE
SOVIETS PROBABLY WOULD BE UNWILLING TO TURN TO A DISCUSSION
OF REDUCTIONS UNTIL A FREEZE HAD BEEN AGREED ON.

E. EVEN IF AFTER EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS THE SOVIETS
AGREED IN SOME FORM TO THE PRINCIPAL ALLIANCE POINTS --
EXCHANGE OF DATA AND NO NATIONAL SUBCEILINGS -- IT WOULD
NOT BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO AGREE TO A FREEZE. OTHER
PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHED THEREBY, SUCH AS UNEQUAL MANPOWER
CEILINGS AND INVOLVEMENT OF ALL ELEMENTS AND COUNTRIES,
PLUS THE REDUCED PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE
REDUCTIONS, WOULD MORE THAN OFFSET THESE GAINS.

F. MOREOVER, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT ALLIED
EFFORTS TO ATTACH CONDITIONS TO THE FREEZE PROPOSAL WOULD
PROVE SUCCESSFUL.

THE SOVIETS COULD OFFER COMPROMISE PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD
BLUR OR UNDERMINE ALLIED ARGUMENTS FOR NOT ACCEPTING
EASTERN CONDITIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE EAST MIGHT ACCEPT
A FREEZE AT THE LEVELS ESTABLISHED BY ALLIED DATA WHILE
MAINTAINING ITS POSITION THAT THE DATA ARE NOT ACCURATE;
OR CLAIM THAT DATA EXCHANGE WOULD BE TOO TIME-CONSUMING
BEFORE A FREEZE, WHILE EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE
IN IT AFTER A FREEZE. THE EAST MIGHT ALSO ACCEPT OVERALL
CEILINGS FOR THE PURPOSE OF A FREEZE ONLY, ACCCOMPANIED BY
DISCLAIMER OF PRECEDENT FOR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION NEGOTIA-
TIONS. IN THESE WAYS, THE EAST COULD FORCE THE ALLIES TO
ACCEPT A FREEZE WITHOUT SATISFYING ANY OF THE CONDITIONS
ATTACHED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 011498

G. FOR THESE REASONS, WE CONSIDER THAT THE ALLIES
SHOULD DEFINITIVELY REJECT THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL.

3. YOU SHOULD PUT FORWARD FOR SPC CONSIDERATION, THE
FOLLOWING SUGGESTED GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP:

BEGIN TEXT: THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ARE AUTHORIZED TO TELL
THE EAST THAT, AFTER MUCH STUDY, THE ALLIES HAVE CONCLUDED
THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THEY SHOULD
STATE THAT THE MAIN BUSINESS OF THE VIENNA TALKS IS TO
NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES DO NOT OPPOSE A FREEZE
AS SUCH; BUT BELIEVE THAT A FREEZE SHOULD BE COMBINED
WITH AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED
A FREEZE IN CONNECTION WITH PHASE I REDUCTIONS, AND THEY

CONSIDER THAT THIS COMBINATION OF FREEZE AND REDUCTIONS
REPRESENTS A MORE PRODUCTIVE APPROACH TO THE CENTRAL TASK
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAN THE EASTERN APPROACH. END TEXT KISSINGER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMED FORCES, DATA, AGREEMENT DRAFT, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 17 JAN 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE011498
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: THIRSCHFELD
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750017-1007
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750141/aaaabkiy.tel
Line Count: 172
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 MAR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <31 MAR 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <15 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BFR: ALLIED TREATMENT OF EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: NATO BRUSSELS
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006